William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 33 | Issue 1

Article 13

2006

The Wrong Gameplan: Why the Minnesota
Vikings' Failure to Understand Minnesota's Values
Dooms Their Proposal for a New Stadium and
How the Team Can Improve Its Future Chances
Ian Dobson

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Dobson, Ian (2006) "The Wrong Gameplan: Why the Minnesota Vikings' Failure to Understand Minnesota's Values Dooms Their
Proposal for a New Stadium and How the Team Can Improve Its Future Chances," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 33: Iss. 1, Article
13.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss1/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Dobson: The Wrong Gameplan: Why the Minnesota Vikings' Failure to Underst
14. DOBSON - RC - REFORMAT 1.DOC

11/22/2006 10:48:57 AM

THE WRONG GAMEPLAN: WHY THE MINNESOTA
VIKINGS’ FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND MINNESOTA’S
VALUES DOOMS THEIR PROPOSAL FOR A NEW
STADIUM AND HOW THE TEAM CAN IMPROVE ITS
FUTURE CHANCES
Ian Dobson†

I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 485
II. OVERVIEW OF STADIUM FINANCING ......................................... 488
A. History of Stadium Financing.............................................. 489
B. Reasons Teams Demand New Stadiums ............................... 490
C. Arguments Opposing Public Financing of Stadiums ............ 493
D. Arguments Supporting Public Financing of Stadiums.......... 498
III. HISTORY OF STADIUM FINANCING IN MINNESOTA .................. 502
A. Metropolitan Stadium.......................................................... 502
B. The Metrodome .................................................................... 504
IV. THE NEW VIKINGS STADIUM..................................................... 507
V. SOLUTION FOR THE LEGISLATIVE IMPASSE .............................. 510
A. The Vikings’ Current Failure to Win a Stadium................. 511
B. Suggestions for the Vikings’ Stadium Drive ....................... 514

I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 20, 2005, Minnesota Vikings owner Zygi Wilf
announced an agreement with Anoka County to build a $675
1
million stadium to be the new home of the Minnesota Vikings.
The Vikings sought $790 million in total funding for the project,
because $115 million from the state would be designated for
† Law clerk to the Hon. Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for
the District of Minnesota, J.D., 2006, University of St. Thomas School of Law. My
thanks to Ed Edmonds, Associate Dean for Library and Information Technology
and Professor of Law, Kresge Law Library, Notre Dame Law School, for his
comments during the preparation of this article.
1. Kevin Duchschere, Vikings Plan Draws Cheers and Concern, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Sept. 21, 2005, at A1.
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improvements in the transportation infrastructure surrounding the
2
stadium. The proposal relied on nearly $510 million of public
money: $280 million from Anoka County, and $230 million from
3
the State of Minnesota.
The Vikings agreed to invest $280
4
million. Wilf had owned the Vikings for just a few months, having
5
bought the team for $600 million after previous owner, Red
McCombs, failed for years to get a new stadium or relocate the
6
team to a different market.
McCombs’s difficulties in the stadium battles had little effect
on Wilf’s ambition for a new facility. Wilf began to push for a new
Vikings stadium almost immediately after he purchased the
Vikings. Within moments of the National Football League (NFL)
owners vote making him the new owner of the team, Wilf outlined
7
his vision of a new open-air stadium for the Vikings. But what
made the fight for a new stadium particularly difficult, beyond
simply asking the Minnesota state government for several hundred
million dollars for a football stadium, is that the Vikings were in
stiff competition for a new stadium with the other two athletic
tenants of the Metrodome, the Minnesota Twins baseball club and
8
the University of Minnesota Gophers football program. The Twins
had recently developed a proposal to build a baseball-only stadium
in downtown Minneapolis, with no state contributions, while the
2. Anoka County (MN) & Minnesota Vikings, Outline of Proposed Terms: New
Stadium, http://www.co.anoka.mn.us/EconomicDevelopment/stadium/pdf/agre
ement-between-anoka-county-vikings2.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2006). These
infrastructure projects include widening Interstate 35W in the suburbs north of
Minneapolis and improving the on and off ramps near the stadium. Id. Currently,
these road projects are not slated to be constructed until 2020 or later. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. The NFL team owners approved the sale on May 26, 2005 by a 32–0 vote.
Sid Hartman, Fowler Couldn’t Put Up Money, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 26,
2005, at C3.
6. Red McCombs began advocating for a new stadium shortly after he
bought the Vikings in 1998. Kevin Seifert & Sid Hartman, Owner Has Concerns
About Team On, Off Field, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 19, 2001, at C6.
7. Jay Weiner, It’s Unanimous: Wilf Takes Purple Reins, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), May 26, 2005, at A1.
8. Minnesota Sports Facilities Commission, About the Hubert H. Humphrey
Metrodome, http://www.msfc.com/about.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 2006). The
Minnesota Twins have planned a $478 million stadium, of which Twins owner Carl
Pohlad will pay $125 million and Hennepin County will fund the rest with a 0.15%
sales tax. Patrice Relerford & Matt McKinney, 2005 Legislature: Stadiums, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), July 11, 2005, at A1. The Minnesota Gophers have advocated for a
$235 million stadium, 40% of which will be paid for by the state, with the rest
being paid for by private donations, student fees and parking revenues. Id.
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University of Minnesota had been pushing for its own stadium,
9
arguing that it was a public institution deserving of public dollars.
The Metrodome in Minneapolis was the last of the multi10
purpose stadiums developed during the 1970s and 1980s to
minimize the headaches and financial commitment a city faces in
building separate stadiums for different sports. However, it
appears to have caused the Twin Cities and Minnesota a serious
problem. Because there is only one stadium for the three athletic
teams, the stadium has become outdated for all of its tenants at
once, causing each team to demand a new facility.
This paper focuses on the Vikings’ proposal for a new stadium
in this competitive climate. The Vikings, after starting at the end of
the line in Minnesota’s stadium race, made a proposal that failed to
gain the approval of the Minnesota State Legislature, leaving the
team as the only tenant of the Metrodome without a new stadium
11
in the works.
The Vikings’ proposal has not only ignored
Minnesota’s particular history of stadium financing, it has ignored
most of the broader arguments for and against stadium financing.
This paper attempts to illustrate how the Vikings broke from
Minnesota’s evolving principles and attitudes toward stadium
financing and to demonstrate how this break doomed the Vikings’
proposal for a stadium even as other stadium proposals succeeded.
Additionally, this paper attempts to offer a solution, or at least a set
of guiding principles, to Minnesota’s stadium conundrum.
This paper first provides a broad overview of stadium financing
in the United States by analyzing the historical context regarding
9. Kevin Duchschere, Dane Smith & Mike Kaszuba, Vikings Have Deal for
Blaine Stadium, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 20, 2005, at A1.
10. The other multi-purpose stadiums built during this time were Riverfront
Stadium in Cincinnati, built in 1970 (renamed Cinergy Field in 1997); the
Astrodome in Houston, built in 1965; Veterans Stadium in Philadelphia, built in
1971; Three Rivers Stadium in Pittsburgh, built in 1970; San Diego Stadium
(renamed Jack Murphy Stadium in 1980, renamed Qualcomm Stadium in 1997)
in San Diego, built in 1968; Candlestick Park in San Francisco (renamed 3Com
Park in 1995, renamed Monster Park in 2004), built in 1960; and the Kingdome in
Seattle, built in 1976. See Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, Build the Stadium—
Create the Jobs! in SPORTS, JOBS & TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND
STADIUMS 30–48 (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997).
11. In 2006, the Minnesota State Legislature passed bills to construct both a
new football stadium for the University of Minnesota and a new baseball stadium
for the Minnesota Twins. See Act effective May 25, 2006, ch. 247, 2006 Minn. Sess.
Law. Serv. 274, 274–78 (West) (providing funding and conditions for the
University of Minnesota football stadium); Act effective May 27, 2006, ch. 257,
2006 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. 393, 393–406 (West) (providing for financing,
construction, and operation of baseball stadium).
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stadium financing and offering a discussion of the arguments for
12
and against public financing. Next, it discusses the history of
Minnesota’s professional athletic stadiums, specifically analyzing
the reasons for constructing stadiums for the Twins and the Vikings
and addressing the difficulties Minnesota encountered throughout
13
the construction of these stadiums. The paper then outlines the
Minnesota Vikings’ proposal for a new stadium, contrasting the
current justifications for the stadium with the justifications for
previous stadiums, all in the context of Minnesota’s current
14
legislative discussions. Finally, the paper concludes by offering a
solution to Minnesota’s current debate which encourages a
discussion that relies on Minnesota’s traditional justifications for
15
stadium financing.
II. OVERVIEW OF STADIUM FINANCING
Stadium financing is a topic that has demanded the attention
16
of entire books.
The complex interplay of various funding
mechanisms with local and federal tax codes, combined with
economic and social justifications for and against public support of
stadiums, makes the topic far too detailed for an all-encompassing
discussion. Therefore, this section attempts to explain the three
areas most relevant to Minnesota’s decisions regarding stadium
financing. First, this section briefly addresses the history of stadium
financing from the 1800s to the present day, focusing on the
evolution of public opinion with regard to the public financing of
stadiums. Second, this section discusses the reasons professional
sports teams request public funding to build stadiums. Finally, this
section discusses the major arguments, both economic and social,
presented by those supporting and opposing the public financing
of stadiums.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
E.g. JOANNA CAGAN & NEIL DE MAUSE, FIELD OF SCHEMES: HOW THE GREAT
STADIUM SWINDLE TURNS PUBLIC MONEY INTO PRIVATE PROFIT (1998); KEVIN J.
DELANEY & RICK ECKSTEIN, PUBLIC DOLLARS, PRIVATE STADIUMS: THE BATTLE OVER
BUILDING SPORTS STADIUMS (2003); Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 10; MARK S.
ROSENTRAUB, MAJOR LEAGUE LOSERS: THE REAL COST OF SPORTS AND WHO’S PAYING
FOR IT (1999).
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History of Stadium Financing

Over the last century, diverse methods of stadium financing
have emerged. Since the 1800s, stadiums have been financed
publicly, privately, or with combinations of both public and private
17
money. Historically, more public dollars than private dollars have
18
While public funds for
been spent on stadium construction.
stadium construction have always been questioned, it was not until
the 1960s, when Americans were paying for an expensive war in
Vietnam and dealing with massive social changes, that the public
began to raise serious arguments about the priority of government
19
funding of stadiums. Accordingly, the federal government began
to encourage local governments to increase private sources of
20
funding for the construction of stadiums.
Interestingly, the
federal government advanced its solution to increase private
funding for stadiums by making interest on local bonds, used for
21
stadium financing, tax deductible.
Local government bonds
would be more attractive, making it easier to finance public
stadiums by selling bonds, and thereby pushing the expenses of the
stadiums back onto the federal government.
Consequently, public financing of stadiums was slow to
deteriorate. In fact, although strong resentment to public financing
of stadiums began in the 1960s, the public share of stadium
construction rose to its high point during the 1970s, when
approximately 90% of the cost of athletic stadiums was paid for by
22
the public. But since the 1970s, public contributions to stadium
construction have fallen to the point where during the 1990s, eight
of the twenty-seven stadium projects actually had greater private
than public investment and only seven stadiums were fully publicly
23
funded.
Despite the fact that the public has taken on a smaller portion
of the costs for new stadiums, the construction of new stadiums has
17. Frank A. Mayer, III, Stadium Financing: Where We Are, How We Got Here, and
Where We Are Going, 12 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 195, 196 (2005) (citing MARTIN J.
GREENBERG, THE STADIUM GAME 187 (2d ed. 2000)).
18. Id. at 211.
19. Id. at 197.
20. Id.
21. Andrew H. Goodman, The Public Financing of Professional Sports Stadiums:
Policy and Practice, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 173, 177–78 (2002).
22. Rodney D. Fort, Stadium Votes, Market Power and Politics, 30 U. TOL. L. REV.
419, 427 (1999).
23. Id.
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exploded over the last decade. Of the 111 American professional
sports franchises that existed in 2001, 102—or 92%—of the
franchises had moved into either a new stadium or a significantly
24
renovated stadium during the previous decade. Nearly all of the
stadiums built within the last decade have had some form of public
25
funding.
Furthermore, between 2000 and 2005, twenty-one
stadiums were built for the four major professional sports in
26
America.
B. Reasons Teams Demand New Stadiums
Although the specific reasons vary from sport to sport, owners
of professional sports franchises, in all sports, have requested that
governments build new stadiums for their teams to play in. These
requests stem from the revenue enhancements new stadiums
provide to the teams. Stadium revenues have had a particularly
large impact on the total revenue of Major League Baseball (MLB)
27
teams. In recent years, stadium revenues have doubled to reach
28
about 20% of a team’s total revenue. Furthermore, NFL rules on
revenue sharing make specific sources of revenue, such as profits
from luxury box rentals, which are not shared, preferable to other
29
sources of revenue for a franchise owner. This fosters a strong
24. Brett Smith, If You Build It, Will They Come? The Relationship Between Public
Financing of Sports Facilities and Quality of Life in America’s Cities, 7 GEO. PUB. POL’Y
REV. 45, 45 (2001).
25. Id.
26. Mayer, supra note 17 at 195. These stadiums include: Paul Brown
Stadium, Cincinnati (football, 2000); Nationwide Arena, Columbus (hockey,
2000); Comercia Park, Detroit (baseball, 2000); Enron Field, Houston (baseball,
2000) (renamed Minute Maid Park in 2002); Pacific Bell Park, San Francisco
(2000) (renamed SBC Park in 2004, renamed AT&T Park in 2006); Xcel Arena, St.
Paul (hockey, 2000); American Airlines Center, Dallas (basketball and hockey,
2001); Invesco Stadium at Mile High, Denver (football, 2001); Miller Park,
Milwaukee (baseball, 2001); Heinz Field, Pittsburgh (football, 2001); PNC Park,
Pittsburgh (baseball, 2001); Ford Field, Detroit (football, 2002); Gillette Stadium,
Foxborough, MA (football, 2002); Reliant Stadium, Houston (football, 2002); SBC
Arena, San Antonio (basketball, 2002) (renamed AT&T Center in 2006);
Seahawks Stadium, Seattle (football, 2002) (renamed Qwest Field in 2004) ; Great
American Ballpark, Cincinnati (baseball, 2003); Lincoln Financial Field,
Philadelphia (football, 2003); Citizens Bank Park, Philadelphia (baseball, 2004);
Petco Park, San Diego (baseball, 2004). See id. at 195 n.1.
27. Fort, supra note 22, at 419.
28. Id.
29. See Clay Moorhead, Note, Revenue Sharing and the Salary Cap in the NFL:
Perfecting the Balance Between NFL Socialism and Unrestrained Free-Trade, 8 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 641 (2006) (explaining current NFL revenue-sharing plan).
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desire on the part of franchise owners not only for new stadiums
but for single-purpose stadiums that can cater to both the inherent
needs of particular sports and to the rules of each league, thereby
maximizing an owner’s profit.
Regarding the inherent differences between sports, the appeal
of a single-purpose stadium stems from the enhanced sight lines it
offers spectators. This advantage is apparent when comparing
football and baseball. In football, where the bulk of the action
takes place in the middle of a rectangular field, the least desirable
seats are at the stadium’s end. Therefore, football-only stadiums
maximize the number of seats along the sidelines and minimize the
30
number of seats at either end.
By contrast, in baseball the
majority of the action takes place in the diamond-shaped infield
and at home plate.
Therefore, baseball-only stadiums are
constructed with grandstands that extend out from behind home
31
plate, minimizing the seats in the outfield areas. By providing
these enhanced sight lines, owners are able to increase ticket prices
32
to reflect the enhanced experience of attending a game.
New stadiums offer owners other revenue enhancements as
well. New stadium designs include more high-priced luxury suites
33
and club seats.
The designs provide larger, more accessible
concession areas and are better suited for advertising displays,
34
Team owners are able to make additional
which can be sold.
profits through the sale of the stadium’s naming rights, personal
35
seat licenses, and parking spaces during games.
Furthermore, changes in stadium construction have had a
particularly important impact in the NFL because of specific NFL
rules regarding revenue sharing. In the NFL, the home team
36
shares 34% of its gate or ticket revenues with the guest team. But
only a small portion of the revenue from luxury seating is
designated as ticket revenue, meaning the bulk of the revenue
37
from a luxury box is not shared.
Also, unlike other forms of
30. MICHAEL LEEDS & PETER VON ALLMEN, THE ECONOMICS OF SPORTS 173
(Victoria Warneck, Roxanne Hoch & James Rignery eds., 2002).
31. Id.
32. Mayer, supra note 17, at 206.
33. Id. at 198–204.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Jarrett Bell, Percentage of Revenue Shared Rises, USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 2006, at
2C.
37. LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 30, at 80–81. Only a small portion of the
revenue from luxury suites is shared because only the price of the seat in a luxury
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revenue, like national television broadcast fees, the NFL does not
share luxury box revenue with players as part of the salary cap
agreement, making owners much more interested in demanding
38
new stadiums with more luxury boxes.
Therefore, because of
these advances in stadium construction and the relative speed with
which these changes came to the market, some analysts believe any
39
stadium over ten years old is now “economically obsolete.”
Beyond mere additional revenue, new stadiums are appealing
to owners because they increase the value of the teams that play in
them. One high-profile example involves our current President,
George W. Bush. In 1989, Mr. Bush led a group of investors in
purchasing the Texas Rangers for $83 million; Mr. Bush’s initial
40
investment was $600,000.
Mr. Bush was then successful in
persuading both public officials and the general public to support a
41
0.5% sales tax to finance a new ballpark for the Rangers. After
the Rangers moved into their new stadium, The Ballpark at
Arlington, the investor group sold the Rangers in 1998 to Tom
42
Hicks for $250 million.
Mr. Bush’s share of the proceeds was
43
estimated at $16 million. Regardless of the potential for greater
revenues, clearly an owner can profit with a new stadium by selling
a team that is more valuable simply because it plays in a new venue.
One final reason owners advocate for new stadiums is the
belief that on-the-field performance is a direct result of a team’s
financial condition. Under this argument, a team that does better
financially will be able to afford better players, coaches, personnel
directors, etc., and thus, will be able to perform better on the field.
This argument seems to have special importance in baseball, which
44
has no salary cap, and the National Basketball Association (NBA),
which has a soft salary cap that allows a team to exceed the league’s
box counts as shared revenue under the rules. For example, a team that sells a
luxury box with 20 seats for $100,000 a year may claim the value of each seat to be
$100. Therefore, the value of the ticket sales would be $16,000 (20 seats X $100 X
8 home games). Therefore, the owner would get to keep $84,000 for the rent of
the suite and split the $16,000 from the seats 60/40 with the guest team. See id. at
81.
38. Id. at 83.
39. Mayer, supra note 17, at 195.
40. Goodman, supra note 21, at 190.
41. Id. at 190–91.
42. Id. at 191.
43. Id. at 191.
44. See Michael Felger, In a Dream World, Randy’d Be Dandy, BOSTON HERALD,
Oct. 8, 2006, at B22 (stating that Major League Baseball has no salary cap).
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45

maximum payroll under certain conditions. But even in the NFL,
which has the most restrictive salary cap, the need for higher profits
to improve on-the-field performance is arguably due to the cost of
coaches, talent scouts, facilities, and other expenditures that are
not counted under the salary cap, but nonetheless have a
46
significant effect on a franchise’s on-the-field performance. Some
have even suggested that the NFL may be the league where new
stadiums are most important to the success of a team. This is
because NFL teams share more of their revenue with other teams
than other professional sports. Therefore, NFL teams attempt to
expand revenues that are not shared in an effort to gain an
economic advantage over their rivals and increase their talent level
47
in these non-capped areas.
C. Arguments Opposing Public Financing of Stadiums
Opposition to public financing of stadiums encompasses both
economic and moral arguments. One argument of opponents is
that the economic gain touted by stadium proponents is nominal at
best. Opponents also argue any economic gain that is created by a
stadium will flow to already-wealthy owners and athletes. Finally,
opponents argue that by funding a stadium that increases the
number of club seats and luxury boxes, the consumption benefits
of the improved stadium are provided to the wealthy who generally
live in the suburban areas, while the poorer citizens from inside the
city subsidize the stadium’s construction through local taxes.
With respect to economic gain, opponents cite numerous
studies that purport to show that stadium projects have had no
45. Richard A. Kaplan, The NBA Luxury Tax Model: A Misguided Regulatory
Regime, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1615, 1644 (2004). The notable exceptions to the NBA
salary cap are the “Larry Bird” exception, which allows a team to exceed the salary
cap in order to re-sign its own players, the $1 million exception, and the Mid-Level
Salary Exception. Id.
46. Todd Senkiewicz, Stadium and Arena Financing: Who Should Pay?, 8 SETON
HALL J. SPORT L. 575, 576 (1998). The contention that a team’s entire staff will
significantly impact the team’s on-the-field performance is pertinent to the
Minnesota Vikings organization. The Vikings previous owner, Red McCombs,
while advocating for a new stadium, consistently cut all personnel costs for the
organization other than player salaries. The Vikings had the lowest paid coaching
staff in the NFL and a poorly staffed organization. Patrick Reusse, Sold: The
Vikings; NFL’s Bottom Line is Always About Money, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 26,
2005, at C1; Kevin Seifert, Vikings Insider: Don’t Blame Red For 30 Years of Dysfunction,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 23, 2005, at S2.
47. Senkiewicz, supra note 46, at 576.
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positive economic effect on the communities that have built them.
One commonly cited study by the Congressional Research Service
analyzed thirty stadium projects and concluded that twenty-seven of
these projects had no discernable economic impact on the
community while the other three projects actually had a negative
49
effect on the community.
Opponents of stadium financing
explain these results by claiming that the money spent on
attending sporting events is part of an individual’s disposable
entertainment budget, which would be spent on other forms of
entertainment if the stadium and the team that plays in the
50
stadium were not available. Mark Rosentraub, a researcher who
studies the impact of professional sports teams on communities,
supports this belief, estimating that only between 12% and 34% of
the attendance at a sporting event constitutes an actual increase in
51
spending within the community.
Opponents also argue that the multiplier effect—the idea that
money spent at the stadium will be circulated throughout the
community and cause greater economic gain—which is commonly
52
argued in support of stadium financing, is virtually nonexistent in
53
professional athletics. First, they argue sports franchises simply do
not employ enough people to create a substantial multiplier
54
effect.
Further, even the athletes, who take by far the largest
portion of a franchise’s payroll, are likely to create a smaller
48. See, e.g., Senkiewicz, supra note 46, at 589 (“Despite the lofty numbers
often cited by economic forecasters, an increasing number of studies from the
federal government and independent researchers has shown that stadium deals
are not economically beneficial to a community.” (citing William J. Donovan,
Stadiums: Winners or Losers?, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Feb. 26, 1997, at A1)).
49. Id. at 589; DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, TAX-EXEMPT
BONDS AND THE ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS STADIUMS (1996).
50. Mayer, supra note 17, at 215.
51. Senkiewicz, supra note 46, at 589.
52. LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 30, at 199.
53. See, e.g., Joseph Spiers, Are Pro Sports Teams Worth It? Cities Are Paying Out
Billions to Woo Pro Sports Franchises, But Despite the Hoopla, Teams Don’t Do Much for
Local Economies, FORTUNE, Jan. 15, 1996, at 29 (providing a critic’s contention that
professional sports teams do not cause net beneficial economic growth for local
economies).
54. In 1992, Mark Rosentraub studied 161 counties in the United States with
300,000 residents or more. Senkiewicz, supra note 46, at 591. After doing so, he
concluded that professional sports teams accounted for only 0.06% of the private
workforce in these counties and only 0.10% of the county’s payroll. Id. These
discoveries led Rosentraub to determine that professional sports franchises were
actually small- to medium-sized firms. Id. See also ROSENTRAUB, supra note 16
(providing further analysis of Rosentraub’s work following his 1992 study).
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multiplier effect than individuals employed in other industries.
Professional athletes, who are traded and move with more
frequency than individuals employed in other areas, tend not to
live in the cities of the teams for which they play. Therefore, a high
proportion of their income is spent outside of the team’s city.
Additionally, an athlete’s career is much shorter than most other
professions, meaning athletes have a strong incentive to save a
higher proportion of their income for the future, which further
56
reduces the multiplier effect in the community.
Finally, with
respect to increased jobs unrelated to athletes and coaches,
opponents of public financing for stadiums contend that the
majority of these jobs are seasonal, temporary, and low-income, and
consequently not worth the large public expenditures of building a
57
new stadium.
Opponents also argue the spillover effect—the economic
benefit generated from additional spending around the stadium—
58
is small and has actually been minimized, sometimes purposefully,
59
in the designs of the newest stadiums. First, they argue that the
spillover effect is small due to the low number of people who

55. A similar argument that does not address the multiplier effect is that this
concentration of wealth among athletes and owners has a negative impact on job
creation because other leisure businesses, which would employ more middle-class
individuals with the same amount of money being spent, are forced to compete
with sports franchises for individuals’ disposable income. Robert A. Baade & Allen
R. Sanderson, The Employment Effect of Teams and Sports Facilities, in SPORTS, JOBS &
TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS 92, 99–100 (Roger G.
Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997).
56. LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 30, at 199–202.
57. Senkiewicz, supra note 46, at 592. By way of comparison, Alabama was
criticized for spending $300 million dollars in 1993 to subsidize the construction
of a manufacturing plant for Mercedes that would employ 1500 people, a cost of
$200,000 per job. Baade & Sanderson, supra note 55, at 99–101. But only three
years earlier, in 1990, Arizona authorized the expenditure of $240 million for the
construction of a baseball stadium expected to add 340 jobs, a cost of $705,800 per
job. Id. Not only does the stadium represent a vast increase in public expenditure
per job, but it also represents an expenditure for what are arguably less desirable,
non-manufacturing jobs. Id.
58. See Robert A. Baade, The Impact of Stadiums and Professional Sports on
Metropolitan Area Development, 21 GROWTH & CHANGE 1 (1990) (concluding that new
stadiums have a potentially negative impact on local development and personal
income).
59. See infra Part III.B (explaining that the Metrodome was built to minimize
growth around the stadium).
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actually attend a game during the course of a calendar year. Over
the course of a season, the average baseball team sells
approximately two million tickets while other sports sell tickets in
61
the hundreds of thousands. Therefore, although baseball likely
has the greatest potential for significant spillover effect, this is
arguably a small effect in a metropolitan area in which many tens of
thousands of people commute every day to a downtown area to
62
work.
Second, opponents argue that changes in attendance and the
63
distribution of teams further reduces the multiplier effect. An
increase in the popularity of professional sports has created an
expansion in both the number of cities that have teams and the
64
number of individuals who own season tickets. Thus, people from
outside a city are less likely to travel to a specific city to see a game
because a visit to virtually any large city in the country provides an
65
opportunity to see a game. And the ability to actually purchase a
ticket when traveling to a city is reduced, because most of the
66
tickets are already in the hands of season ticket holders.
Therefore, opponents argue that people who travel to a city and
attend a game likely travel to the city for alternate purposes such as
visiting family members or business and would travel to the city
67
regardless of the existence of a professional sports franchise.
Of greatest concern to opponents of public stadium financing
are situations in which a stadium is built outside the central area of
68
a city.
Locating a stadium outside the city could theoretically
60. Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and
Facilities, in SPORTS, JOBS & TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND
STADIUMS 55, 57 (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997).
61. Id.
62. Approximately 165,000 people travel to jobs in downtown Minneapolis
(population: 385,000) on a daily basis. Dan Olson, Minneapolis Targets Downtown
Jams and Neighborhood Speeding, MINNESOTA PUBLIC RADIO, Nov. 2, 2006, http://
minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2006/10/30/mplstranspo/.
63. See Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 60, at 57.
64. Id. at 70.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See, e.g., Mark S. Rosentraub, Stadiums and Urban Space, in SPORTS, JOBS &
TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS 178, 179 (Roger G.
Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997) (stating that current justifications for
developing stadiums “incorporate a discussion of both the redevelopment efforts
that can be led or jump-started by ballparks and arenas and the micro-level
impacts of sports facilities and events on downtown areas”).
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reduce any possibility of a spillover effect that would benefit the city
team because people must drive out to isolated areas to attend a
game. In a suburban or rural setting, game attendees will be
unable to walk to local businesses near the stadium to spend their
money on an after-game beer or plate of chicken wings, and
instead must spend their additional money on restaurants and
69
services offered by the stadium. Therefore, any profits that may
be captured by the community due to the presence of a stadium
are instead captured by the team owner, who often does not even
live in the community. Notably, this is true for the Vikings two
70
most recent owners: Red McCombs is from San Antonio, Texas
71
and Zygi Wilf is from New Jersey.
Outside of the purely economic arguments, opponents argue
that funding these stadiums provides an unjust subsidy to the
72
wealthy at the expense of the poor. If the owner’s purpose in
building a new stadium is to reap greater profits from higher ticket
prices, then only wealthier citizens who can pay those higher prices
will be able to enjoy the new facility. These residents tend to live in
73
suburban areas.
Therefore, when stadiums are built in the
downtown area of a city and the taxes are increased in that area,
the taxes fall on the people with the least ability to enjoy the
benefits, while those who live outside the area are granted a free
74
ride into the new luxury boxes. In order to accommodate the
increased number of luxury boxes and club seats, the number of
general admission seats must be reduced. Furthermore, even seats
that are available at a low cost tend to have a poor view of the field
in order to ensure the best view to the luxury boxes and club seats

69. In response to this criticism, many cities have constructed stadiums in
downtown areas in order to move teams from the suburbs back to downtown and
maximize the spillover effect. LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 30, at 182.
70. Jim Souhan, Red, Purple: The Right Mix, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 6,
1998, at C10.
71. Indeed, every member of the investor group that purchased the Vikings
from McCombs comes from outside of Minnesota. See Kevin Seifert, Quick Fixes,
Long-Term Plan, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 17, 2005, at C1; Kevin Seifert,
Vikings Notes: Wilf’s True Colors are Purple, Gold, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 20,
2005, at C4.
72. See, e.g., Update: Sports-Stadium Funding, ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES, Aug.
23, 2004, http://personal.ecu.edu/aldermand/geog2019/stadium_funding_issue
.html (“Critics also complain that public funding for sports stadiums only makes
the rich richer at the expense of the common taxpayer.”)
73. See LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 30, at 213.
74. Id.
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75

that demand a higher price.
Also, although not directly
connected to stadium construction, opponents argue that as teams
rely more and more on cable television rather than network
television to broadcast their games, middle- and low-income
families have a more difficult time watching the games, as they
76
must either purchase the cable packages, or attend the games.
One final argument made by opponents is that, contrary to
owners’ contentions, on-the-field performance is not enhanced by
77
the additional revenues of a new stadium. These arguments are
based on the premise that salary caps limit what an owner can
spend in most sports, and that even in baseball, which has no salary
cap, an owner’s primary source of profit is through the local
78
television deals. Therefore, new stadiums would simply enhance
the profits of the owners with little change to what type of talent
they employ. Some analysts have even indicated that the average
winning percentages of teams with new, publicly funded sports
79
facilities may be lower.
D. Arguments Supporting Public Financing of Stadiums
Like their opponents, supporters of public financing of
stadiums believe their cause is justified through economic analysis
and social or community benefits. Stadium proponents emphasize
that professional sports teams add substantial wealth to a
community’s economy, and that stadium construction is necessary
75. Many times, to accommodate the luxury boxes, the general admissions
seats get pushed higher and farther back. For example, in Detroit, one advocate
explained that the last row of the upper decks of both Tiger Stadium and
Comiskey Park were closer to the field than the first row of the upper decks in
both of their replacement stadiums. Id. at 178–79.
76. Id. at 212–13.
77. See, e.g., Taxpayers League of Minnesota, 8 Reasons to Reject Publicly
Financed Stadiums for Professional Sports Teams, http://www.taxpayersleague.org/
NewIssues/stadiums/stadiums.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
78. These local television deals no doubt give considerable advantages to
large market teams. New York Yankees owner George Steinbrenner was able to
create an entire television network, the YES network, to broadcast Yankee games.
Steinbrenner was then able to contract with the local cable companies to carry the
network at a substantial profit. See John M. Higgins & Anne Becker, Squeeze Play,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 1, 2004, available at http://www.broadcastingcable
.com/article/CA476553.html/?display=Top+of+the+Week.
Twins owner Carl
Pohlad attempted this same business plan when he created Victory Sports. Id.
Pohlad’s attempt eventually failed and he sold the Twins broadcasting rights to
Fox Sports Net North. Id.
79. Smith, supra note 24, at 55.
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for attracting and retaining these teams. Proponents also argue
that professional sports teams bring a sense of civic pride to a
community that is not quantifiable or allocable to a market system.
They conclude that government should supply these opportunities.
Finally, proponents point to alleged problems inherent within
private financing that cause difficulties for a community, implying
that these difficulties in private financing justify government
intervention in order to monitor and regulate stadium
construction.
To support the claim that professional sports add considerably
to the economic health of a community, proponents offer estimates
80
of the benefits. One commentator has calculated that for every
single dollar spent on professional sports in a community, an
additional $1.75 is created and household income rises an
81
additional seventeen cents.
Furthermore, this commentator
argues that for every $1 million a community spends on
82
Most of these
professional sports, seventy-six jobs are created.
economic benefits stem from individuals who come from
communities outside the team’s metro area to attend a game and
spend money on hotels and dining that otherwise would not be
83
spent. A supportive example of this phenomenon can be found
in the Dallas, Fort Worth area, where the consulting firm Coopers
and Lybrand estimated that spending in the area increased by $239
million during the first year of the operation of The Ballpark at
84
85
Arlington.
Of this, $140 million was generated in Arlington.
Furthermore, the consulting firm estimated that 5100 jobs were
86
created due to the opening of the ballpark.
Outside of the spending increases in the community, stadium
supporters contend that the professional sports teams attract white87
collar business. The influx of these businesses stems both from
the desire of businesses to seek the best and brightest workers and

80. E.g., Study Estimates $30 Million Annual Boon From Indianapolis NFL Stadium,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 14, 2004.
81. Mayer, supra note 17, at 212 (citing Tom Powell, Influx Of New Stadiums,
Arenas Will Continue Past 2000: Lonergan, AMUSEMENT BUS., Aug. 18, 1997, at 12).
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. See Senkiewicz, supra note 46, at 581 (describing the revenue streams and
economic impact of the stadium).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 17.
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88

from the enhanced publicity a city gets from having a sports team.
Corporations and other large businesses will locate offices in areas
that have competitive advantages in luring prospective employees
away from their competitors. And a professional sports team is
simply one more amenity a corporation can offer prospective
89
employees. This gives any community with a professional sports
team a natural advantage in attracting and retaining businesses that
90
will supply jobs to the community. Furthermore, a professional
sports team gives a city the publicity needed to gain a national
91
identity, familiarizing business people from around the nation
with the city. Therefore, supporters of public stadium financing
conclude that the increase in white-collar business is a community
benefit justifying the investment in a stadium, even against claims
that the stadiums do not directly supply many jobs.
Stadium proponents also argue that professional sports teams
provide intangible benefits, unaccounted for by the market
92
system.
These intangible benefits, they argue, further justify
public expenditures on stadiums to attract and retain teams.
Ballparks, like a number of activities, such as community recycling
programs, may not necessarily pass a cost-benefit analysis, but are
93
nonetheless socially efficient. Professional sports are a social good
because they foster citizens’ feelings of pride in a city. The
94
existence of this pride is evidenced by entire news segments
95
devoted specifically to local sports. Also, a team’s presence, even
if not adding economically to the metropolitan area as a whole,
may provide a social good by helping to revitalize a downtown area.
In support of this contention, proponents of public financing point
to Bank One Ballpark in Phoenix and the Gateway Sports and
Entertainment Complex in Cleveland, both of which have arguably
88. Id. at 212–13.
89. Id.
90. Id. (describing benefits associated with public funding of a stadium).
91. See Senkiewicz, supra note 46, at 593 (discussing community benefits of a
new stadium).
92. See, e.g., Mike Swift & Dan Haar, Football: Who Really Wins? Stadium’s Value a
Subjective Matter, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), Dec. 8, 1998, at A1 (pointing to a
proponent’s belief that a new stadium would be a “rebirth” to the city).
93. See Allen R. Sanderson, In Defense of New Sports Stadiums, Ballparks and
Arenas, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 173, 189 (2000) (framing the argument for new
stadiums within an externalities analysis).
94. See id. at 190 (explaining why sporting events meet traditional public
goods criteria).
95. See id. at 188.
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96

helped to revitalize forgotten areas of those communities. With
these arguments, proponents of public financing contend that even
without a positive economic impact on the community, public
97
dollars for stadium construction are still justified.
Finally, stadium supporters contend that private funding
comes with its own problems, problems which would also be felt by
98
the entire community. One example is the demise of the Oregon
Arena Corporation (OAC), a privately funded venture led by
Portland Trailblazers owner Paul Allen, to build a new arena for
99
the team. After assembling a group of private investors to build a
100
new arena, the Rose Garden, interest in the team declined,
pushing attendance down for general admission, club seating, and
101
luxury suites.
Consequently, the Trailblazers were unable to
make their lease payments. Although Allen, along with Microsoft
Corporation co-founder, Bill Gates, bailed the team out with their
personal fortunes, the OAC eventually was forced to declare
102
bankruptcy.
Consequently, some of these private investors
became overburdened with debt, affecting the surrounding
community as businesses in the neighborhood of the arena
103
suffered loss of revenues. As the OAC lost control of the arena to
private investors, the Trailblazers suffered further financial
burdens, affecting the team’s chances to remain in the community.
In the bankruptcy process, the team lost all revenue from the
luxury boxes, much of the revenue from higher priced seats, and
104
all revenue from the arena’s naming rights.
Also, the team
cannot count on securing the best dates for games, potentially
affecting attendance and television viewership, and has lost the
96. See Goodman, supra note 21, at 207–208 (discussing evidence that favors
publicly subsidized sports stadiums). The Cleveland Gateway Complex consisted
of the Indians’ new home, Jacobs Field, and the Cavaliers’ new home, Gund Arena
(renamed Quicken Loans Arena in 2005). See Cleveland Indians, Ballpark, http://
indians.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/cle/ballpark/cle_ballpark_history.jsp (last visited
Nov. 17, 2006).
97. See Allen R. Sanderson, In Defense of New Sports Stadiums, Ballparks and
Arenas, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 173 (2000).
98. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 17, at 218–24.
99. See id. at 219–21 (recounting the history of the OAC and financing for the
arena).
100. Id. at 218 (explaining the purpose and background of the OAC).
101. Id. at 222 (listing reasons for the Rose Garden’s drop in revenues).
102. Id. at 220 (explaining the circumstances of the OAC bankruptcy).
103. Id. at 223.
104. Helen Jung, Blazers Also Need Another Kind of Turnaround: Financial,
OREGONIAN, Mar. 6, 2005, at C10.
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105

concessions contract.
To remedy the situation, the team has
recently attempted to secure public funding, leaving open the
106
option of relocating the team as a bargaining tool.
Therefore,
stadium supporters assert that funding stadiums privately can have
disastrous effects on a community, such that public expenditures
are justified.
III. HISTORY OF STADIUM FINANCING IN MINNESOTA
Minnesota has, by all accounts, had a difficult time providing
stadiums for its professional sports franchises. One commentator
has suggested that the Twin Cities’ almost “farcical experience with
sports” positioned it as the “all-time winner in per capita frequency
107
of facility construction.”
Although this criticism speaks to the
poor economic planning of Twin Cities officials, Minnesota’s
experience with stadiums has, until recent times, had little to do
with economic justifications, but rather with social pride.
Therefore, these criticisms have little hold on the Twin Cities
unless they can be attached to the community’s concern for civic
pride. This section will briefly discuss Minnesota’s history of
stadium financing via the construction of Minnesota’s two “big
league” stadiums: Metropolitan Stadium in Bloomington and its
replacement, the Metrodome, in downtown Minneapolis. This
section will also briefly outline the purported justifications behind
the construction of each stadium, as well as the criticisms and
difficulties faced by the projects.
A.

Metropolitan Stadium

Metropolitan Stadium, or the “Met,” was the Twin Cities’ first
bona fide major league stadium, even though the stadium was
actually located in the outskirts of the Twin Cities, in the suburb of
108
Bloomington. Completed in 1956, the Met had been a four year
project by several area businessmen who began developing it in July
109
The cost of constructing the stadium was $4.5 million
of 1952.
105. Helen Jung, Blazers: We Need a Hand to Survive in Portland, OREGONIAN,
Feb. 24, 2006, at A1.
106. Id.
107. Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 10, at 4.
108. Joe Soucheray, Metropolitan Stadium: The Park Built for Outdoor Baseball,
http://www.msfc.com/ann_before_metropolitan_stadium.cfm (last visited Nov.
23, 2005).
109. See JAY WEINER, STADIUM GAMES: FIFTY YEARS OF BIG LEAGUE GREED AND
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110

and it was paid for entirely by private dollars.
The project was
originally developed for the “long-term civic imagery of the
growing metropolitan area of Minneapolis-St. Paul—and for their
111
regional self esteem.”
The Met was developed, therefore, not to
promote economic development, but to push Minneapolis and St.
112
Paul into the “elite club of major-league cities.”
From its very beginnings, the Met had a storied life. Although
the Met was built to attract a professional baseball team, it was not
initially successful. When the Met opened, it did not attract a team,
but instead acted as a leverage point for other teams to encourage
their home cities to build a new stadium under the threat of
113
relocation. In fact, the first major league team to agree to play in
the Met was not a baseball team, but rather the NFL’s Minnesota
Vikings, who began playing in 1961, five years after the Met was
114
built.
But later that same year, the newly acquired Minnesota
Twins, a transplanted team formerly known as the Washington
115
Senators, began to play in the Met.
But just a few years after the Vikings and Twins began to play
in the Met, football’s emerging national prominence encouraged
other cities to build stadiums better designed for NFL team
116
purposes.
This, combined with the worries of declining cities
such as Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and St. Louis about
their futures, created an explosion of the new, multi-purpose
117
stadiums shared by both NFL and MLB teams.
This left the Met

BUSH LEAGUE BOONDOGGLES 1–24 (2000) (detailing the historical development
and financing of the Metrodome).
110. Soucheray, supra note 108.
111. WEINER, supra note 109, at 1.
112. Id. at 61.
113. Id. at 24. During the first five years of the Met’s existence, it was home to
the minor league Minneapolis Millers. The Millers were owned by New York
Giants owner Horace Stoneham.
Because of this, speculation was that
Minneapolis would become the home of the Giants. But in 1960, Stoneham
moved his team to San Francisco, forcing Minneapolis to look elsewhere.
Soucheray, supra note108.
114. WEINER, supra note 109, at 47.
115. Id. at 54; Soucheray, supra note 108.
116. See P. Sumner, Sports Spaces in the Age of Modernity, ARCHITECTURE INK,
http://www.architectureink.com/2002-10/sumner.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2006)
(“Running concurrently with the advent of the dome was the design and
realization of the multi-purpose stadium. Designed to accommodate both baseball
and football in the 1960s and 1970s, the landscapes of cities on both coasts and
points in between were dramatically changed.”)
117. See WEINER, supra note 109.
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outdated within ten years of its completion: “It was the first time—
but not the last—that Minnesota dropped behind the curve of
stadium construction . . . [t]he Twin Cities have never led. They’ve
118
always trailed.”
To confront this, the Vikings were initially granted permission
119
to add seating to the Met. But these additions damaged the
stadium’s architectural integrity, and the Metropolitan Sports
120
Council began to discuss whether a new stadium was needed.
Despite these additions, the Vikings had the smallest stadium of any
121
NFL franchise. Therefore, the Vikings helped develop a plan for
122
a new, larger facility that would increase their ticket sales.
Baseball teams around the country had accepted the new stadiums,
even if their configuration was not ideal, because of their benefits
123
over the older stadiums; the Twins took a similar position.
B. The Metrodome
Like the Met before it, the Metrodome was not built under the
auspice of an economic benefit. In the first years of the discussions
that would eventually lead to the construction of the Metrodome,
public officials’ plans were met with vigorous opposition by citizens
124
who did not want public dollars directed toward a new stadium.
Still, public proposals were considered, including a 1972 proposal
to build a $49.1 million stadium and parking ramp in downtown
Minneapolis and a proposal to build a stadium in Bloomington to
125
keep the teams from leaving for Minneapolis.
In 1973, one
thousand people attended a public hearing in Minneapolis to turn
down the proposed $49.1 million project, seeing it as an
126
“unwelcome financial burden” for the city.
Likewise, St. Paul
118. Id. at 60–61.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 62–63.
121. See WEINER, supra note 109.
122. Id. at 63–65.
123. Id. at 60–65. Initially, the Twins pushed for a domed stadium with a
retractable roof, believing that it would increase attendance by 150,000–200,000
fans per year. Id. at 65.
124. Id. at 75–76. The groups that opposed construction of the Metrodome
were the groups that again led the charge against the new stadium proposals in
the 1990s and 2000s: anti-tax Republicans and progressives concerned with poverty
and social stratification. Id.
125. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission, History of the Metrodome,
http://www.msfc.com/history.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
126. Id.
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State Senator John Chenoweth considered the new multi-purpose
stadium “dead” because taxpayers were “unwilling to sign a blank
127
check.”
But concern about this “blank check” was alleviated
when the Minnesota State Legislature passed a no-site bill, which
128
This no-site bill
created a commission to develop a stadium.
strictly limited the money that could be spent on a stadium, with
specific spending limitations conditioned on particular aspects of
129
130
the finalized plan.
After weighing several proposals,
the
commission decided to construct an indoor, domed stadium in
downtown Minneapolis.
With such public opposition to the large expenditures
necessary to build a stadium, it is reasonable to conclude that the
131
Metrodome was not seen as an “investment” by the community.
That is to say, it was not built under the pretense that it would
generate economic growth in the surrounding community. In
addition to passing the no-site bill limiting what could be spent on
the stadium, the legislature also conditioned the issuance of bonds
for the construction of the Metrodome on obtaining a team lease
132
sufficient to repay the bonds. Therefore, although the legislature
was willing to float the money necessary to build the Metrodome, it
wanted the teams to pay the money back, indicating it did not see
the stadium as an investment that would pay for itself through
economic development.
Most interesting is that the Metrodome was specifically built in
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. MINN. STAT. § 473.581, subd. 3 (2004). The commission could spend no
more than $55 million to build a domed stadium anywhere other than
Bloomington, $37.5 million to build a new football stadium in Bloomington and
remodel the Met for baseball, or $25 million to remodel the Met to be a multipurpose stadium. Id.
130. The commission received a total of eight stadium proposals.
Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission, supra note 125. Two of these proposals
came from Minneapolis, one proposal came from Saint Paul, and the suburbs of
Bloomington, Brooklyn Center, Coon Rapids, and Eagan also offered proposals
individually. Id. There was also a proposal to place a stadium in the “Midway”
area between St. Paul and Minneapolis. Id.
131. Senator Chenoweth articulated this by framing the stadium dilemma as a
discussion of how much Minnesota was willing to pay for the Vikings to remain:
“We're interested in having the Vikings stay, but the question is: what is the price?"
Id.
132. The Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission was required to execute
agreements with major league teams to ensure the use of the facilities for a period
of time long enough to generate revenues to retire the bonds. See MINN. STAT. §
473.581, subd. 3(a) (2004).
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order to minimize growth around the stadium. Set on the edge of
downtown, city planners ensured that the Metrodome would not
create another entertainment district in downtown Minneapolis to
133
compete with Hennepin Avenue. In fact, only one establishment
can claim a significant benefit from the presence of the
Metrodome, the bar Hubert’s, located across the street from the
134
stadium.
If Minnesota did not build the Metrodome to achieve an
economic gain, it nonetheless had a purpose behind the
expenditure. Several purposes have been suggested. Indeed, the
1977 purpose statement, drafted in creating the Metropolitan
Sports Facilities Commission, stated that the purpose of the new
facility was to fulfill the metropolitan area’s undefined “need” for
135
sports facilities that could not be met by private funding.
The
Minnesota Supreme Court determined that the “primary purpose”
of building the Metrodome was not economic development, but
rather the creation of an entertainment and recreation option for
136
local residents.
Yet another purpose of developing the
Metrodome was to shift the focus of the city back to the downtown
137
Therefore, it appears
area and boost confidence in the region.
that Minnesota built the Metrodome not because it had visions of
economic gain, but rather because it established a price it was
willing to pay for a community service.

133. WEINER, supra note 109, at 71.
134. Id. at 72.
135. See MINN. STAT. § 473.552(a) (2004). It should be noted that this
Minnesota statute does claim that the Metrodome promoted the “economic and
social interests of the metropolitan area.” Id. at (b). However, this reference to
both the economic and social interests was added in 1994 when the Minnesota
State Legislature authorized the public acquisition of the basketball and hockey
arena in downtown Minneapolis that was the home to the Minnesota
Timberwolves and the Minnesota North Stars. Therefore, this language is better
understood as justification for acquiring this basketball and hockey arena rather
than justification for construction of the Metrodome. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §
473.552(c) (2004).
136. Lifteau v. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n, 270 N.W.2d 749, 755 (Minn.
1978). Although the court noted that a new stadium would provide some
temporary and permanent jobs and benefits to local businesses, the use of the
existing stadium by non-sports groups such as alcoholics, the police federation and
rock fans provided sufficient justification for the stadium beyond economic
growth. Id. at 754–55.
137. WEINER, supra note 109, at 71.
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IV. THE NEW VIKINGS STADIUM
The Minnesota Vikings asked for a new stadium in a difficult
environment. Earlier in 2005, the Minnesota Twins and Hennepin
County reached a deal to finance a $478 million dollar baseballonly stadium; Twins owner Carl Pohlad would pay $125 million and
the county would finance the remaining expenses through a thirty138
year sales tax increase of 0.15%.
This plan was contingent upon
legislative approval of a bill allowing the tax to be imposed in
139
Hennepin County without a voter referendum. At the same time,
the University of Minnesota advanced a stadium proposal, which
was originally set at $235 million dollars, but is now estimated to
cost more than $248 million due to an increase in the price of
140
building products following Hurricane Katrina.
Thus, with the
Vikings’ proposal on the table, the legislature was contemplating
$962.2 million in government spending to build three sports
141
stadiums.
This is daunting for a state that has an annual budget
142
of merely $46.6 billion and has recently slashed $1.2 billion in
143
spending due to budget shortfalls.
The Vikings’ difficulty was further enhanced because they were
asking for public funding to come from the state government,
unlike the Minnesota Twins, who were merely asking for the state
to approve a plan in which Hennepin County would finance the
144
stadium.
Furthermore, the money that would come from Anoka
138. Mike Kaszuba & Dane Smith, Stadium Proposals Jostle for Support, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Sept. 25, 2005, at B1; Charley Shaw, Extra Innings for Minnesota
Legislature?, ST. PAUL LEGAL LEDGER (Minn.), Aug. 25, 2005.
139. Duchschere, Smith & Kaszuba, supra note 9. Minnesota currently allows
a county to levy a local sales tax, provided the tax is designated for a specific
capital improvement and the tax is approved by voters through a general election.
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297A.99, subd. 3 (2004).
140. Dane Smith, ‘U’ Stadium Cost Estimate Up $13 Million, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Sept. 24, 2005, at B1.
141. This calculation was derived by taking the total cost of the Vikings
development, including road construction costs, and subtracting the $280 million
proposed contribution from the Vikings. It then adds $99.2 million for a Gophers
stadium, which was derived by calculating the 40% state contribution of a $248
million dollar stadium. Finally, it adds $353 million for a new Twins stadium,
which is derived by subtracting the Twins $125 million contribution from the $478
million estimated cost of the stadium.
142. Minnesota Department of Finance, State Budget at a Glance, http://
www.budget.state.mn.us/budget/budget_glance.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
143. Letter from Peggy Ingison, Minnesota Commissioner of Finance, to
Minnesota Governor, Tim Pawlenty (Nov. 19, 2004), http://www.finance.state.mn.
us/accounting/2004/2004cafr.pdf.
144. Press Release, Minnesota Twins, Twins Announce New Ballpark Plan:
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County in the Vikings’ plan required a larger county-wide sales tax
145
than the Twins’ plan required.
The Vikings made their task more difficult, however, because
146
they advocated for a stadium principally on economic grounds,
something not done for either of Minnesota’s previous stadium
projects. The benefits listed by Anoka County in support of the
stadium included the addition of 4300 construction jobs and
several thousand permanent jobs, the creation of a tourist and
entertainment destination, the attraction of $1 billion in private
development, and a strengthened property tax base allowing local
147
governments to keep property taxes low. Similarly, Ron Jerich, a
lobbyist for both Anoka County and the Anderson Construction
Company, a company vying for the construction contract, said: “If I
was a legislator I’d [build all three stadiums] . . . . You know what
148
this is? That’s jobs – jobs for Minnesotans.” Steve Novak, Anoka
County’s stadium project manager, claims the cost of the stadium
will be $45 per year for every taxpayer, but that the stadium will
149
generate $280 per year for every taxpayer.
Unlike either the
Metrodome or the Met before it, the new Vikings’ stadium
proposal seeks approval because it promises economic
development for the local community and the state.
It should also be mentioned that one justification for the new

Collaboration Between Club, Hennepin County (Apr. 25, 2005), http://
minnesota.twins.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/news/search_archive.jsp?c_id=min&cate
gory=pr&month=04&year=2005&pg=1 [hereinafter Press Release, Minnesota
Twins].
145. While the Twins had advocated for a 0.15% sales tax (fifteen cents per
$100), the Vikings and Anoka County requested a county sales tax of 0.75%
(seventy-five cents per $100). See Press Release, Anoka County, Northern Lights
Minnesota Sports, Retail & Entertainment Center Project Summary Sheet, http://
www.co.anoka.mn.us/EconomicDevelopment/stadium/pdf/stadium-projectsummary.pdf [hereinafter Press Release, Anoka County] (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
See also Press Release, Anoka County, Anoka County and Vikings Reach Agreement
(Sept. 20, 2005), http://www.co.anoka.mn.us/v1_departments/div-governmentalservices/dept-public-information/news-releases/05-09-20-vikings.asp.
146. It should be noted that the Vikings have discussed advocating for the
stadium based on community pride, although they have yet to take a strong
approach in doing so. An Anoka County official urged both the Vikings and
Anoka County to emphasize that the stadium would mean “jobs – pride – [and]
tax base” for the county. Mike Kaszuba, Determined Dealmaker, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Mar. 1, 2006, at A1.
147. Press Release, Anoka County, supra note 145.
148. Duchschere, Kaszuba & Smith, supra note 9.
149. Sarah McCann, Is Blaine Ready?, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 21, 2005,
at N1.
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stadium offered by Anoka County appears to be in direct conflict
with Wilf’s intentions not to move the team. Anoka County has
indicated that one reason for building the stadium is that if the
Vikings relocate to another community it will cost Minnesotans
more money to bring in a new team than it does to simply build a
150
stadium to keep the Vikings.
Previous Vikings owner Red
McCombs had no qualms with the idea of relocating the team. In
contrast, Wilf has been adamant that he will not move the Vikings:
151
“We will be in the Minneapolis area forever.”
The Vikings may have valid reasons for arguing that the
stadium will bring economic development, even if the Metrodome
and the Met did not have such an impact. The Vikings’ stadium
proposal is part of a larger plan directed at greater economic
development, something not true of the Metrodome or the Met.
Unlike the previous attempt to place the Metrodome in an area
that would minimize its competition with other entertainment
destinations, the Vikings and Anoka County have attempted to
maximize the stadium’s economic impact by incorporating it into
the existing National Sports Center, which already has facilities for
152
soccer, golf, and ice skating.
Furthermore, the suburban city of
Blaine, which is the area now under consideration for the site of
the new stadium, has large open spaces in which to include areas
for shopping, entertainment, restaurants, housing, and corporate
153
space. Indeed, the Vikings stadium is justified as the cornerstone
of a larger $1.5 billion development dubbed the “Northern Lights
Sports, Retail and Entertainment Center,” which would include a
public retail and entertainment area extending out of the stadium,
a corporate center, residential housing, and a wetlands
154
preservation area. While Wilf has committed $280 million toward
the stadium, he also promised further investments to the
surrounding area that will raise the amount of private investment
155
to approximately $1 billion.
The Vikings and Anoka County see
150. Among the economic arguments advanced by Anoka County is a Federal
Reserve Study indicating that communities which recently lost a team are
consistently willing to spend more money to bring in a new team than they would
have needed to spend to keep their old team. Press Release, Anoka County, supra
note 145.
151. WEINER, supra note 109.
152. Duchschere, supra note 1.
153. McCann, supra note 149.
154. Vikings Stadium Plan Aired at Capitol, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 17,
2006, http://www.startribune.com/510/story/314673.html .
155. Id.
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these developments as an opportunity to create a larger spillover
effect for the community as some family members will spend
Sundays cheering at the Vikings game, while other family members
156
will come to shop in the surrounding area.
Despite the distinctions between the recent Vikings’ stadium
proposal and the previous stadiums in Minnesota, the proposal was
unsuccessful in the 2006 Minnesota State Legislature while the
proposals by the Twins and the University of Minnesota succeeded.
This failure is not surprising, however, given the legislature’s
persistent refusal over the last decade to build a new Vikings
stadium, in opposition to the persistent advocacy for a stadium on
behalf of former Vikings owner, Red McCombs.
V.

SOLUTION FOR THE LEGISLATIVE IMPASSE

The difficulty that the Vikings have experienced in persuading
the legislature to build them a football stadium no doubt has a
strong connection with the simultaneous demands of the Twins
and the Gophers. It is not difficult to imagine that three separate
stadium demands can have the effect of freezing the legislature on
any one of them; none of the proposals can be decided upon
without considering the effects that decision would have on the
other two proposals. Indeed, Minnesota House Speaker Steve
Sviggum enunciated this very concern, saying that all of the
157
stadium proposals may “die under their own weight” and that
passing bills to construct “three stadiums in one session is a bigger
158
bite than many are willing to take.” But this did not happen.
Instead of all of the stadium proposals failing, the Vikings were left
out of the stadium bonanza that landed the Twins and Gophers
their new facilities. This outcome was not particularly surprising to
those who followed the stadium debates because the Vikings’ hopes
for a new stadium had consistently been on hold until both the
159
Twins’ and Gophers’ stadiums were resolved.
This section will first discuss why the Vikings and Anoka

156. McCann, supra note 149.
157. Kaszuba & Smith, supra note 138.
158. Vikings Stadium Plan Aired at Capitol, supra note 154.
159. See Kaszuba & Smith, supra note 138. House Speaker Sviggum also
expressed this belief: "We should try to move ahead incrementally, maybe Gophers
and Twins first, and the Vikings in two years. “ Id. Sviggum continued, “I'm not
saying I'm against a Vikings stadium, but they're a step too far, as far as public
financing burden.” Id.
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County have failed in their attempts to sway both the Minnesota
State Legislature and the voting public in support of a new stadium.
Specifically, it will emphasize the Vikings’ failure to use the type of
arguments that have historically worked in Minnesota as utilized by
the Twins and Gophers. Second, this section will present several
arguments that the Vikings could use to present a more effective
case for a new stadium.
A. The Vikings’ Current Failure to Win a Stadium
The reason for the tepid response from both the legislature
and the public at large for a Vikings stadium is due in part to the
Vikings’ inability to effectively push their proposal. First, the
Vikings have failed to answer why the Metrodome apparently
became outdated as quickly as it did. Second, the Vikings have
ignored many of the arguments made both for and against new
stadium construction over the years. Finally, and most importantly,
unlike the Twins and the Gophers, the arguments that the Vikings
have ignored most are the very arguments that have been most
effective in Minnesota.
As discussed above, since the construction of the Met,
Minnesota has consistently fallen behind on the stadium curve.
One question that the Vikings must answer today is whether
building another stadium will simply keep Minnesota at the back of
a new curve. As one stadium supporter wrote in 2005, “[a]nyone
who follows sports nationally knows that the Metrodome has been
160
obsolete for 15 years, both aesthetically and financially.” If this is
true, the Metrodome became “obsolete” in 1990, less than a decade
after it opened. While the Twins and Gophers could hide behind
the argument that the domed, NFL-size stadium never fit their
needs particularly well, the Vikings cannot make such an argument,
because the Metrodome was designed primarily for them.
Therefore, the Vikings need to answer why this new stadium, which
161
would yet again be built at the end of a national stadium frenzy,
will not become obsolete for the NFL franchise as quickly as
Minnesota’s previous stadiums.
160. Special Session Wanted: Leadership at Capitol, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept.
29, 2005, at A16.
161. Between 1992 and 2005, seventeen of the thirty NFL teams have moved or
were set to move into new stadiums. Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Public Finance of
Sports Stadia: Controversial But Permissible…Time for Federal Income Tax Relief for State
and Local Taxpayers, 1 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 135, 143 (2002).
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Furthermore, although economic arguments may have been
effective in pushing stadium construction in other areas of the
country, these arguments have been ineffective in Minnesota.
Indeed, Minnesotans have seen public stadium financing as a
162
financial burden.
Minnesota has built stadiums when either
private individuals or public officials perceive a social, as opposed
to economic, benefit. Specifically, these groups have invested in
new stadiums when they have determined that the stadium will
enhance the cosmopolitan nature of the Twin Cities.
Minnesotans see the Twin Cities as their centerpiece for
cosmopolitan life, briefly and affectionately altering the name of
the state’s largest city into the “Mini-Apple” to invoke comparisons
to the “Big Apple” and preaching “that there is more to their city
163
than cows, cornfields, and contentment.” Due to this pride in the
cosmopolitan hub, the state has consistently wanted the Twin Cities
164
to have “what other big cities had.” Consequently, Minnesota has
built stadiums to maintain a vibrant, cosmopolitan city for which
the state can take pride, ensuring that the Twin Cities would not be
165
“a cold Omaha.”
Under this framework, the benefit of
constructing the Met stadium was to bring a team to town and
establish the Twin Cities as a “major league” city. Likewise, the
construction of the Metrodome was purposed on bringing the two
major league teams downtown, establishing the heart of a
cosmopolitan city. Even the stadium names cry out to the state, as
well as the world, that the Twin Cities represents a true
cosmopolitan metropolis. Whatever social benefit may exist in
constructing a new Vikings stadium in Blaine, the Vikings and
Anoka County have yet to establish one and push it with a sense of
166
unity.
162. See supra Part III.B.
163. AMY KLOBUCHAR, UNCOVERING THE DOME: WAS THE PUBLIC INTEREST SERVED
IN MINNESOTA’S 10-YEAR POLITICAL BRAWL OVER THE METRODOME? 6 (1982).
164. This desire for what other cities have has not been limited to stadiums.
During the years before the Metrodome was built, Minneapolis added the Guthrie
Theater, the Walker Arts Center, and Orchestra Hall, as well as Nicollet Mall
running through downtown. Weiner, supra note 109, at 75. Similarly, in the years
preceding the 2006 stadium battle, Minneapolis underwent an “arts explosion” in
which all four of the city’s art museums expanded, the two largest theatre
companies acquired new venues, and the library received a new downtown
flagship building. Tim Bewer, Minneapolis Drawing on Expansions to Fuel Arts
Explosion, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 22, 2005, at H1.
165. This slogan was made famous by Hubert Humphrey during the debate
regarding the construction of the Metrodome. WEINER, supra note 109, at 77.
166. It should be noted that Zygi Wilf has pushed the idea of an open-air
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Conversely, both the Twins and the Gophers have articulated
social benefits justifying their requests for new stadiums. Although
the Twins proposal has been linked to economic development, the
Twins have specifically dropped their economic argument
regarding the stadium, saying: “If there are side benefits, great. If
167
not, so what?”
Supporters of the Twins stadium argued that
Major League Baseball is a necessary good for the maintenance of a
168
Therefore, the threat of losing the Twins
cosmopolitan city.
169
became vitally important to the Minnesota State Legislature.
Beyond simply mitigating against the loss of a team, supporters
focused the argument on positive aspects of the new stadium for
the community. Supporters focused on how the stadium would
bring “outdoor baseball” back to the Twin Cities and would be a
170
Thus, the
centerpiece for the city’s historic Warehouse District.
new Twins stadium would both enhance the experience for the
typical Twins fan, improve the quality of life, and would be a
stadium to give the Vikings a better home field advantage, particularly in the cold
months, and also to connect with the franchise’s historic roots, no doubt in
reference to the “Purple People Eaters” that played in the open-air Met stadium.
See Kevin Seifert, Vikings Ponder Whether to Let Go of Roof Idea, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Nov. 30, 2005, at C5. Conversely, Anoka County has consistently
advocated that a retractable roof is necessary to make the stadium a year-round
sports venue. However, due to the legislature’s concern about the stadium’s
expense, the Vikings and Anoka County have discussed eliminating the plan for
the roof in order to save the state the $115 million cost associated with it. Id.
167. This comment was made by Jerry Bell, president of Twins Sports, Inc.
Mike Meyers, Twins Drop Stadium’s Economic Argument, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
June 19, 2005, at D1.
168. See Patrick Reusse, Gophers Stadium: House, Senate Approve Bill New Field of
Dreams, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 21, 2006, at C1 (“A new Twins ballpark will
be a victory not for intense lobbying but for a city’s health. Major league sports
are good. Period.”)
169. The bill authorizing the construction of the new Minnesota Twins
ballpark stated that “Major League Baseball provides to the state of Minnesota and
its citizens highly valued intangible benefits that are virtually impossible to
quantify.” Act effective May 27, 2006, ch. 257, 2006 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 393,
393–406 (West) (providing for financing, construction, and operation of baseball
stadium) (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 473.75). This threat peaked just before
Minnesota’s 2006 legislative session when a state court judge ruled that the Twins
did not have to play in the Metrodome following the 2006 season. See Paul Levy,
Vikings Ride Stadium Momentum, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 29, 2006, at B1.
Because of this ruling, Twins owner Carl Pohlad decided to sell the team following
the season if a stadium bill was not passed. Had this occurred, the new Twins
owner would likely have moved the team. Sid Hartman, Sundays with Sid: Stadium
Plan was Essential to Keep Twins Safe at Home, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 21,
2006, at C2.
170. Press Release, Minnesota Twins, supra note 144.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

29

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 13
14. DOBSON - RC - REFORMAT 1.DOC

514

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

11/22/2006 10:48:57 AM

[Vol. 33:1

stadium that the city, and the state, can take pride in. This
contrasts with the Metrodome, which, besides being a relatively
poor stadium for watching a baseball game, stands as an eyesore in
the middle of the city.
Similarly, the Gophers have advocated a social benefit behind
their new football stadium proposal. Although the Gophers could
not use the threat of relocation to push for a stadium, the
University of Minnesota contended that a new football stadium on
the university campus would incorporate Saturday games into
university life in a way that cannot be accommodated by other
171
means.
Thus, the stadium would enhance the university
experience and create a sense of unity and pride among the
172
members of the community.
By doing so, the stadium would
help maintain the strong university presence in the state’s largest
city.
B. Suggestions for the Vikings’ Stadium Drive
The supporters of a Vikings stadium have done little to push
the social benefits that a new stadium proposal would bring.
Consequently, bills introduced to the Minnesota State Legislature
for a Vikings stadium have focused heavily on the economic aspects
of constructing a stadium with the only social benefit being that of
173
keeping the team. For those groups to be successful in their push
for a new stadium, they need to offer Minnesota a reason to build
the stadium other than economic development, and they must
integrate the need for a Vikings stadium into the cosmopolitan
character of the Twin Cities. This may take some creativity on the
part of these groups, but arguments on their behalf do exist.
First, the Vikings may push the stadium in the same way the
Twins have pushed their proposed stadium, as a stadium of which
171. University of Minnesota, Why a Stadium: An Opportunity of a Lifetime, (Jan.
11, 2006), http://www.umn.edu/stadium/why.html.
172. Id. This argument worked especially well. Prior to signing the bill,
Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty expressed his excitement for the new game-day
atmosphere that the stadium would create: “We’ll have that band marching down
University Avenue on Saturday afternoons again.” Reusse, supra note 46.
173. See H.F. 2295, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005). According to the
legislature, the new stadium in Blaine serves a public purpose by “retaining the
Minnesota Vikings as a part of Minnesota's public amenities for its citizens and as a
major attraction to visitors to the state,” thereby “adding to the economic
development of the state, Anoka County, and surrounding communities,
attracting revenue from out of the state, and preserving the contributions of
football to the culture of Minnesota and to the enjoyment of its citizens.” Id. § 2.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss1/13

30

Dobson: The Wrong Gameplan: Why the Minnesota Vikings' Failure to Underst
14. DOBSON - RC - REFORMAT 1.DOC

2006]

VIKINGS STADIUM PROPOSAL

11/22/2006 10:48:57 AM

515

the state can be proud and as a facility that returns outdoor
athletics to Minnesota. Indeed, this is an argument that Zygi Wilf
has voiced periodically, although it has been lost due to Anoka
174
County’s push for a retractable roof.
By promising to bring
outdoor football back to Minnesota, the Vikings have a chance to
capitalize on the local pride of a rugged Minnesota football team
representing the frigid state in the way that the Green Bay Packers
and Chicago Bears represent their communities, as opposed to a
team coddled from the cold weather in a temperature-controlled
environment. But this argument loses its traction when the
proposal requires a retractable roof to protect the team and
spectators from Minnesota’s harsh winter weather.
Another potential argument for the Vikings is that their new
stadium will help to establish an identity for a relatively forgotten
suburban area. Although a recent development boom has allowed
many parts of Blaine to escape the town’s former distinction as a
blue-collar, post-War suburb, Blaine and the northern metro
175
suburbs have yet to establish an identity. With a topography that
lacks the lakes common to other sections of the Minneapolis
metropolitan area, the National Sports Center has arguably created
176
an identity for Blaine. In this way, the Vikings are not promising
that the stadium will help to spur growth in the surrounding area
because the surrounding area will grow regardless of the existence
of a stadium. Rather, the Vikings are offering what would be the
crown jewel of the National Sports Center, solidifying a proverbial
“place on the map” for Blaine and other northern metro suburbs
while creating a new district for the city. If the Metrodome was
placed in downtown during the 1970s to be a confidence booster
for the city, it is not unthinkable that in 2006, after more than
twenty years of urban development, it is now preferable to put a
stadium in Blaine to enhance the metropolitan area. For, as the
state found alternative purposes for the Metrodome, it is certainly
possible that the state may now determine it desirable to serve these
and other purposes in the north metro area.
Finally, the Vikings and Anoka County would be well advised
to advance the same arguments in support of a stadium. Presently,
Vikings owner Zygi Wilf has attempted to endear himself to a
174. Seifert, supra note 71.
175. See Bob Shaw, Blaine Goes Boom, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Sept. 26,
2004, at C1.
176. See id.
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community that was frustrated by Red McCombs’s consistent
threats that if he did not get a stadium, he would relocate the team
to increase his own profits. In doing so, Wilf has specifically
177
promised not to move the team.
This may damage Wilf’s
bargaining power, as the state may determine that while having a
professional football team is an aspect of maintaining a
cosmopolitan city, the construction of a new stadium is pointless if
the team has decided not to relocate. Consequently, Wilf’s position
is risky and will be effective only if he can carve a path that builds a
strong relationship between the community and the team, thereby
promoting the community pride in the team that might turn public
sentiment in favor of constructing a new stadium. According to
Wilf, “this is not a matter of economics, this is a matter of
178
passion” and it should be a matter of passion for the community
as well. Conversely, Anoka County, in its push to justify the stadium
179
economically, has implied that the Vikings may relocate.
By
implying that the Vikings might relocate, Anoka County may be
attempting to suggest that the team’s departure could threaten the
cosmopolitan nature of Minnesota’s only “major league” city. But
this suggestion may be harmful to the county’s ultimate goal—not
only does it conjure up memories of McCombs’s previous threats,
potentially angering the community into rejecting a stadium out of
spite, but it also stands in direct contrast with Wilf’s promises. The
citizens and legislators are forced to wonder whether Wilf’s
promises are truthful or whether Anoka County officials are simply
ignoring them to make what they perceive to be a stronger
argument. Regardless of whether the citizens believe Wilf’s
comments or Anoka County’s implications, the inconsistency can
do nothing but damage relations with the state, forcing officials to
base their arguments more and more on the economic
development promises that have been unsuccessful in Minnesota.
By focusing on the economic arguments that Minnesota has
historically failed to recognize, the Vikings and Anoka County have
done little to ensure their acquisition of a new stadium.
177. See Weiner, supra note 109. See also Sean Jensen, Vikings Sale OK’d, ST.
PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), May 26, 2005, at A1.
178. Weiner, supra note 7.
179. Interestingly, Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty used the relocation
argument to advocate for stadiums, but on the social grounds of retaining the
teams. Referring to the stadium hopes of both the Twins and the Vikings,
Pawlenty said: “It is not necessarily a dollar-for-dollar direct economic value . . . .
But as an overall goal, keeping the teams here has value.” Smith, supra note 140.
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Furthermore, they have denied Minnesotans a valuable civic
debate. While the Vikings will likely receive a new stadium within
the next few years from the growing threat that, despite Wilf’s
statements to the contrary, they may relocate and damage the
180
cosmopolitan nature of the city, the benefit that this speculation
will bring them is valuable only to the degree that it will secure the
minimum financial support needed to keep the team in Minnesota.
Therefore, the stadium will likely be similar to what the Metrodome
was when it opened: inexpensive, but new.
By redirecting the debate to the social benefits of a new
stadium, the state will have the opportunity to determine whether
something more than simply keeping the team should be weighed
against the costs of a stadium. This will only help the Vikings’
chances. If, through debate, Minnesota determines that the costs
of a stadium outweigh the benefits of keeping the team for a
cosmopolitan community, the Vikings will not likely get their
stadium. But if Minnesota is not presented with the opportunity to
truthfully evaluate the social benefits of a new stadium against its
costs, not only will the Vikings lose their stadium bid, but
Minnesota might lose an opportunity to establish a facility for
which the community can be truly proud.

180. The Vikings are contractually obligated to play in the Metrodome until
2011, at which point the team could relocate. Levy, supra note 169. Indeed, the
bill that granted the Twins their new stadium alluded to the possibility of a future
Vikings stadium. It ordered Anoka County and the Vikings to develop a stadium
proposal with a retractable roof and submit a report of that proposal to the
legislature by January 15, 2007. See Act effective May 25, 2006, ch. 247, 2006 Minn.
Sess. Law Serv. 274, 274–78 (West) (providing funding and conditions for the
University of Minnesota football stadium); Act effective May 27, 2006, ch. 257,
2006 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 393 (providing for financing, construction, and
operation of baseball stadium). Furthermore, the legislature authorized Anoka
County to impose the 0.75% sales tax if and when the legislature approves a plan
for the Vikings stadium in the coming years. Act effective May 27, 2006, ch. 257 §
21, 2006 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 393, 406 (West). But due to the Vikings’ failure to
secure a stadium in the 2006 legislature, Wilf has begun to consider options of
renovating the Metrodome now, that the Vikings will be the stadium’s only tenant.
See Sid Hartman, Costs May Prompt Wilf to Weigh Feasibility of Upgrading Dome, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 25, 2006, at C3.
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